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SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE 1995-1996 BUDGET 
IMP ASSEt 
HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR.* 
DENNIS E. LOGUE, JR.** 
I. lNTR.ODUCTION 
With the re-election of a Democratic President and a Republican Congress, 
the uneasy budgetary consensus which developed after the recent budget battle 
and impasse will likely continue. The goal of achieving a balanced budget by 
2002 still appears to hold though serious negotiations must occur regarding the 
looming problem ofhealthcare entitlements. President Clinton's willingness to 
engage in such negotiations is an acknowledgment that difficult decisions must 
be made if balance is to be maintained beyond 2002. Those decisions will 
likely be made jointly by the President and Congress. The 1995-1996 impasse 
indicated that both the President and Congress were willing to shut down the 
federal government rather than yield on their budgetary principles. That will-
ingness guarantees that both branches will have integral roles in the structure 
of future budgets and budgetary policy. Given the desire to avoid annual shut-
downs and the likely voter dissatisfaction that would attend such shutdowns, 
an explicit sharing of budgetary power seems likely. Thus, the United States 
appears on the verge of entering a new budget regime comprised of a balanced 
budget imperative with explicitly shared presidential and congressional re-
t On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court decided Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 2312 (1997). 
While the primary issue in that case was the standing of members of Congress to challenge the 
Line Item Veto Act, the case may eventually have implications for arguments raised in this arti-
cle. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. Professor Chambers 
wishes to thank the entire law faculty at the University of Missouri-Columbia for providing much 
needed commentary regarding this Article at a faculty colloquium, and Mr. Wesley G. Russell, 
Jr., for general comments during innumerable discussions regarding the structure of government. 
Professor Chambers thanks his wife Paula for her patience and the rest of his family. 
** Ph.D. candidate, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, 
University of Virginia. Mr. Logue would like to extend thanks to Professor James Savage and 
especially Professor James Sterling Young for their help on his master's thesis which served as 
the theoretical basis for much of this work. 
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sponsibility over the budget.1 • 
The explicit power sharing portended in the new regime may however run 
afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. In the past, federal budgets have 
reflected various blends of executive and legislative initiatives and priorities. 
However, the budgeting process has not thoroughly embraced the blending of 
executive and legislative power at the micro level.2 Future budgets will likely 
require explicit coordination and, implementation of presidential and congres-
sional agendas. Possible alterations in the budget conferencing system may 
cause many of the decisions that were previously made solely by the Congress 
or the President to be made jointly by them. Such explicit power sharing is a 
direct outgrowth of the budget impasse and a recognition that the President and 
Congress are jointly politically responsible for budget failures and government 
shutdowns.3 Whatever budgetary solution the branches reach will likely in-
volve legislative control or influence over quasi-executive functions, executive 
control or influence over quasi-legislative functions, or combined control over 
all functions. How Congress and the President share the budgetary power, and 
whether such arrangement is memorialized in law or informally enforced, may 
determine whether the arrangement will be allowed under the Supreme Court's 
Constitution-driven separation of powers jurisprudence. 
Blended power in the face of the separation of powers doctrine can be 
problematic. Several ways to interpret the separation of powers exist, and the 
Constitution does not command any particular vision of the separation of pow-
ers.4 Differing views range from those which focus simply on stopping one 
branch of government from accumulating too much power to interpretations 
which perceive each governmental power as being assigned exclusively to a 
particular branch. 5 Often, various interpretations of separation of powers doc-
trine stem from distinctive views of the Founders' reasons for separating pow-
ers. Mandates flowing from a separation of powers doctrine grounded in lim-
iting governmental power will be very different from mandates flowing from a 
separation of powers doctrine based largely on the smooth functioning of a 
I. For an explanation of what constitutes a budget regime, see infra part I. 
2. Indeed, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), arguably suggests that no such blend-
ing on the micro level can occur. For a discussion of Bowsher, see infra part III.B. 
3. Although both branches are responsible for budget failures, one side will tend to get 
more blame. See Charles Tiefer, "Budgetized" Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in 
Congress's I995-I996 Budget Battle, 33 HAR.v. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 440 (1996) (suggesting that 
Congress took more blame for the 1995 budget impasse than President Clinton). 
4. See Hon. Richard S. Arnold Money, or the Relations of the Judicial Branch with the 
Other 1\vo Branches, Legislative and Executive, 40 ST. Lams U. L.J. 19, 23 (1996) (stating that 
though no separation of powers clause exists in the Constitution, the idea is central to the docu-
ment). 
5. For a discussion of these views, see infra part IV. 
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three-branch government. A rigid separation of powers doctrine may yield a 
rigid system of power sharing. Conversely, a flexible separation of powers 
doctrine may allow flexible power sharing arrangements. Different power 
sharing solutions will be deemed constitutional or unconstitutional based on 
the separation of powers analysis the Supreme Court chooses to use. 
The extent to which the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence will 
frustrate budgetary power sharing is unclear. Bowsher v. Synar6 is the Court's 
last direct application of the separation of powers doctrine to budgetary power 
sharing, and it frustrated a portion of the political solution that Congress and 
the President reached under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.7 Whether the 
Court's separation of pqwers jurisprudence will allow future power sharing or 
power allocating political solutions that the President and Congress may reach 
remains to be seen. 
The promise of power sharing in a new budget regime offers a marked im-
provement over the current regime. A power sharing process that establishes 
mechanisms which will insure responsible behavior by the President and Con-
gress leading to control over budget deficits is a good one. If the Constitution 
is a blueprint for the effective use of power and the separation of powers doc-
trine is a means to that end, the Court may need to alter how it views inter-
branch political agreements reached in the interest of reducing partisanship and 
balancing the budget. 
Separation of powers doctrine will have implications for any budget re-
gime which contemplates explicit power sharing. This Article examines the 
possible separation of power pitfalls which threaten to undermine the emer-
gence of a relatively healthy new budget regime and the creative mechanisms 
necessary to make that regime work. The Constitution does not provide many 
explicit instructions regarding the federal budgeting process. Thus, whether a 
particular budget arrangement is a good one requires a largely political analy-
sis.8 Whether a particular budget arrangement is constitutional must be an-
swered by the Supreme Court. On what basis the Court should make such a 
decision, the likelihood that the decision will have an impact on future budget 
arrangements, and whether the Court's vision of the Constitution will unduly 
influence budget reform manifested as power sharing are the key concerns of 
this short Article. 
6. 478 u.s. 714 (1986). 
7. President Reagan acquiesced to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act by signing it. None-
theless, the Solicitor General argued against the provision allowing the Comptroller General to 
control mandatory budget cuts. The Comptroller General's power to require particular budget 
cuts was the core issue in Bowsher v. Synar. 
8. This is not to suggest that the question is nonjusticiable, just that the issue is one that is 
peculiarly relevant to the political arena. 
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II. BUDGET REGIMES 
The 1995-1996 budget impasse forced Congress and the President to iden-
tify budget priorities and budgetary principles that will guide the United States 
in the near future. Agreement on many of those principles has led the United 
States to the verge of a new budget regime. A regime refers to the governing 
philosophy of a nation as it exists in the constitution, laws, and norms by 
which political elites are bound in their actions.9 The philosophy of the gov-
erning regime does not necessarily coincide with the political culture which 
rules the rest of the public.10 A regime may be thought to- be the philosophy 
which controls the actions of political elites, whereas political culture refers to 
the expectations or values held by the majority of the citizenry.11 
A budget regime entails a confluence of a philosophy of spending and a 
philosophy of responsibility.12 The philosophy of spending describes the con-
9. See DALL FORSYTHE, TAXATION AND POUTICAL CHANGE IN THE YOUNG NATION 1781-
1833 2-3 (1977) (stating: 
'Regime' is thus equivalent to the formal rules of political conduct as expressed in written 
constitutions, charters, or statutes, insofar as those rules in fact serve as practical working 
guides to acceptable political behavior. 'Regime' also includes informal specifications of 
the political rules of the game .... Even more generally, 'regime' also specifies other im-
portant limits on political activity ... such as the major settlements defining participation 
in politics, the distribution of political benefits, the types and level of social control avail-
able for use by the political elite, the broad institutional relationships inside government, 
and even the legitimating rhetoric and language of politics.). 
10. /d. at4. 
11. In a political world where reelection may be more important than governing, one would 
expect the behavior of the elites to coincide with the political culture. 
12. An examination of the conjuncture between the philosophies of spending and responsi-
bility reveals the prevailing budget regime. For instance, the first regime from 1789 until 1921 
involved a philosophy of spending which called for balanced budgets and a philosophy of respon-
sibility that was marked by congressional dominance of the budgeting process. A new regime 
formed when the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 called for a balanced executive budget and 
thus gave the President a more prominent role to play in the formulation of the budget. During 
the United States two hundred plus year history there have been five distinct budget regimes. The 
first regime lasted from 1789 until1921. The second regime endured from 1921 to 1933. The 
third existed from 1933 to 1946. The fourth regime went from 1946 to 1974. And the fifth be-
gan in 1974 and perhaps is about to be replaced by the sixth in the coming years. 
PlllLOSOPHY OF SPENDING 
PlllLOSOPHY OF BALANCEDBUDGET KEYNESIANECONOMICS 
RESPONSIBIUTY 
CONGRESSIONAL 
SHARED 
PRESIDENTIAL 
First Regime 
Second Regime 
Sixth Regime 
Third Regime 
Fourth Regime 
BUDGET CONTROL 
Fifth Regime 
1996] SEPARATION OF POWERS 55 
sensus of federal politicians regarding the questions of whether, when and why 
the federal budget should or should not be balanced.13 In the past, rather than 
being a creature of partisan political considerations, the consensus philosophy 
of spending has been justified based on economic and sometimes moral foun-
dations. This reliance on economic justification had led American politicians 
to follow two predominant philosophies of spending: 1) balanced budget, and 
2) Keynesian or full-employment economics. Each of these has a clearly es-
tablished set of guidelines and beliefs about economic determinants which al-
low politicians to justify spending decisions. In the current budget regime, 
however, a third choice which calls merely for control of deficit spending 
seems to have influenced many politicians. This position by most accounts 
lacks a firm economic basis and seems to be more a creation of political con-
venience than economic calculation. 
A philosophy of responsibility references the person or persons who set 
spending priorities and levels and, thus, are accountable for upholding the pre-
vailing philosophy of spending. This aspect of a budget regime addresses the 
roles played by the President and Congress in formulating the federal budget. 
It encompasses how much control the President can legally and/or rhetorically 
exert in setting budget priorities and what committees and interests within 
Congress are served by its budget procedures. The philosophy of responsibil-
ity concerns the constitutional and procedural regulations which govern politi-
cal elites engaged in the budget process. Whereas the philosophy of spending 
remains in the realm of ideas, the philosophy of responsibility is set in the 
context of the separation of powers. As will be seen later in this Article, re-
sponsibility for budget problems has been avoided by both branches, in part 
because the prevailing philosophy of spending allowed them to do so. The 
strongest attempt made to establish some sort of responsibility was partly ne-
gated by the Bowsher Court. Unfortunately, the Court may show similar dis-
regard for carefully negotiated political agreements which probe the bounda-
ries of the separation of powers. 
III. THE CURRENT BUDGET REGIME 
In order to understand the current budget regime and how the country has 
reached it, one must look to the fourth budget regime which began in 1946, 
and ended in 1974 with the passage of the Congressional Budget and Im-
See, Dennis E. Logue, Jr., The Odyssey of the Budget: An Examination of the Political and Eco-
nomic Forces Which Have Shaped U.S. Federal Budget Regimes, (May, 1996) (on file with Saint 
Louis University Public Law Review). 
13. The philosophy of spending emphasizes how much money the govermnent spends, how 
much debt it accumulates and for what economic or political purpose it does so. In general, 
conflicts with regard to where federal funds will be allocated must be decided within the 
boundaries of the reigning philosophy of spending. 
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poundment Control Act of 1974 (CBICA).14 The fourth regime had a 
Keynesian philosophy of spending and a presidential-centered philosophy of 
responsibility. In the 1950s, both major parties accepted the primacy of 
Keynesian economics and the central role of the President in setting budget 
priorities. During the 1950s, politicians generally agreed on the spending cuts 
required under the prevailing budget theory. The cuts were largely made in the 
defense budget because, at the time, it accounted for over fifty percent of the 
federal budget. In the 1960s, this consensus regarding what areas of the 
budget to cut began to disappear as the ideological make-up of the two parties 
changed. The Goldwater-influenced Republicans saw a limited role for gov-
ernment fiscal policy in managing the economy. Consequently, they did not 
favor much spending on social programs directed at individuals. The Demo-
crats were split between a Southern, conservative faction whose views regard-
ing spending mirrored the Republicans and a Northern, more liberal faction 
that desired an increase in government spending on social services. Until 
1963, the Republican/Southern Democrat coalition held the balance of power 
in Congress. After President Kennedy's death and Lyndon Johnson's 1964 
landslide presidential election, the liberal faction gained control of Congress, 
as a group of younger and more liberal politicians who wanted to enact more 
social programs became committee chairmen and congressional leaders. 
In the next few years, Congress passed many of President Johnson's Great 
Society programs, e.g., Medicare and Medicaid, which were designed to help 
the poor and the elderly. The continuing growth of federal revenues which 
were expected from the continued growth of the economy at a rate of 4.4% per 
year seemed to make the expansion of the welfare state possible without a cut-
back in defense spending. The Johnson administration and the liberal Demo-
crats who controlled most of the congressional committees concluded that na-
tional consensus paralleled their efforts to expand the social safety net. Even 
at the outset of the Vietnam War, many believed that the growing economy 
would provide the government with enough revenue to support both the war in 
Vietnam and the "War on Poverty."15 
One need only look at the change in the allocation of funds in the federal 
budget from 1959 to 1974 to appreciate how profound the changes in the atti-
tudes toward government spending which occurred during the 1960s were. In 
1959, the percentage of the federal budget spent on defense was nearly double 
that spent on social programs {53.2% to 27.0%).16 By 1974, the difference had 
14. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1976) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-88 
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). 
15. See ALLEN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING AND TAXING 24-
25 (1980). 
16. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL TABLES 
FISCAL YEAR 1995 38 (1995) [hereinafter OMB Historical Tables]. 
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swung almost completely in the opposite direction. Defense spending 
amounted to 29.5% of the budget while spending for social programs had risen 
to 50.4%.17 The explanation for the radical change in percentages is that while 
spending for defense remained relatively constant at $80 billion since 1969, 
domestic spending doubled from $66 to $135 billion.18 In spite of the dramatic 
growth in social spending which occurred, the overall size of the budget rela-
tive to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) remained consistently between 19% 
and 20% from 1969 to 1974.19 Yet because tax revenues were consistently one 
to two points less than expenditures (except in the anomalous year of 1969) the 
deficit remained and the national debt grew?0 
In the early 1970s, the national economy which had grown at a fairly 
steady rate during the 1960s, slowed. The persistence of recessionary condi-
tions appeared to require Keynesian fiscal stimulus under the old consensus 
regime. In keeping with the prevailing philosophy of spending, President 
Nixon accepted budget deficits declaring that he was an economic Keynesian. 
However, he added a subtle twist to the old economic stability formula, an-
nouncing that in the future, the goal of the government was to achieve bal-
anced budgets during times of full-employment rather than surpluses. This 
was the genesis of the budget control philosophy. The reformulation of the 
spending philosophy meant that under most economic situations, the govern-
ment would be operating at a deficit. 
While this acceptance of deficits was tacitly acknowledged by all the par-
ties in government, it was not a position which many volunteered to share with 
a general public that believed the government would try to balance the 
budget.21 Deficits were acceptable as long as both sides were willing to blame 
their existence on Keynesian economics and not use the deficits as political 
weapons. Thus, when President Nixon decided to run against the spendthrift 
Congress in his 1972 re-election campaign, he broke the unspoken pact which 
had existed throughout his first four years (when much of the growth in social 
spending occurred). In making federal deficits a campaign issue, Nixon indi-
cated that the deficits were not as related to the nation's economic condition so 
much as they were the result of Congress' failure to enact spending controls. 
Nixon's claims crystallized the differences between the two parties with regard 
to the proper role of government in the economy and the allocation of govern-
ment resources. 
17. Id. at 39. 
18. Id. Even the baseline of$66 billion was a doubling ofthe figure from 1964. See id. at 
38. 
19. !d. at 39. 
20. Id. at 17, 39. 
21. See RUDOLPH PENNER & ALAN ABRAMSON, BROKEN PURSE STRINGS: CONGRES-
SIONALBUDGETING, 1974-88 29 {1988). 
58 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBUC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:1 
In his first term, President Nixon did very little to change the budget pri-
orities which he inherited from the Johnson administration. Nixon's first truly 
controversial action, with regard to the budget system, was to request permis-
sion from Congress to change the name and nature of the Bureau of the 
Budget. He wanted to create an Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) 
which would evaluate government programs?2 This new organization would 
be teamed with a Domestic Council of the President as part of an executive ac-
tion to bring the bureaucracy under contro1.23 Congress approved the plan in 
July 1970. 
The creation of the OMB strained presidential relations with Congress. 
President Nixon's politicization of the new office was the biggest problem. 
Prior to the change, Congress had viewed the Bureau as a somewhat reliable 
and unbiased source of information as to the costs of programs and economic 
predictions. After the switch to the OMB, Congress grew increasingly wary of 
the Office's policy evaluations?4 This wariness eventually led Congress to 
make the position of OMB director and assistant director subject to Senate ap-
proval in 1973. 
During the 1972 campaign, Nixon continuously declaimed the spendthrift 
Congress and warned Americans that a congressional tax-hike after the elec-
tion was a possibility. Nixon also challenged Congress to place a $250 billion 
spending limit on the budget for fiscal year 1973. He intimated that if Con-
gress failed to act, he would take action on his own to insure that the spending 
limit was met. After the election, Nixon remained true to his word. When 
Congress was unable to establish a spending limit agreement, Nixon author-
ized the impoundment of over $17 billion of appropriated funds from numer-
ous domestic programs.25 This action created a swarm of controversy around 
the country and on Capitol Hill. Particularly galling to most legislators was the 
fact that almost all of the impoundments were enacted against programs sup-
ported by congressional Democrats?6 It was clear that the intent of the Nixon 
administration was to eliminate executively social programs which it could not 
eliminate legislatively. Among the programs affected by the impoundments 
were water-pollution programs, housing programs and several rural assistance 
programs. Most notable of the programs left untouched by impoundments was 
the $30 billion General Revenue Sharing Act sponsored by the Nixon admini-
stration which had not been passed into law?7 
22. See LollS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 47 {1975). 
23. Id. at 47-48. 
24. See id. at 56. 
25. Id. at 173. 
26. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., BUDGETING FOR AMERICA: THE POLITICS AND 
PROCESS OF FEDERAL SPENDING 54 {1982). 
27. The justification for the withholding of some of the program funds was predicated on 
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The Nixon administration defended impoundment as the routine exercise 
of executive authority and pointed to examples of its previous use by other 
presidents. However, the Nixon impoundments were not routine?8 Rather, the 
impoundments were clearly an example of policy-making and priority-setting 
by the Administration. Although the administration argued that the impound-
ments were legitimate based on readings of the Employment Act of 1946 and 
the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1950/9 these and all the other Administration ar-
guments were rejected. 
In response to the initial Nixon impoundments in 1973, Congress formed 
the Joint Study Committee whose task was to design a method for Congress to 
match the president's expertise in budget matters and devise a way to control 
congressional spending.30 The result was the CBICA, which changed the 
budget system in a multitude of ways. It created a Congressional Budget Of-
fice (CBO) to provide Congress with its own agency to analyze the possible 
budgetary consequences of all proposed legislation.31 Part of the CBO's mis-
sion was to perform five-year economic analyses of all bills presented in Con-
gress.32 Congress empowered the CBO to act as a counterweight to the presi-
dential controlled OMB and to serve as a tool to help Congress design its own 
fiscal policy.33 CBICA also established budget committees in each house of 
Congress.34 The purpose of the committees was to produce budget resolutions 
prior to and just after the various authorization and appropriation committees 
finished their allocation process.35 Under the Act, funds could not be appro-
the Administration's belief that they would be replaced by monies from the revenue-sharing 
plan. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 172. 
28. See ScmcK, supra note 15, at 48. Four different kinds of impoundments have been used 
by Presidents to control government spending. They are: 
(I) routine actions taken for purposes of efficient management; (2) withholdings that have 
statutory support; (3) withholdings that depend on constitutional arguments, particularly 
the Commander-in Chief clause, and; (4) the impoundment of domestic funds as part of 
policy-making and priority-setting by the Administration. 
FISHER, supra note 22, at 148-65. For examples of the successful use of impoundments by Presi-
dents, see id. 
29. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 154. 
30. Pete V. Domenici, The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act: An Exercise in Legislative Futil-
ity?, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 542-43 (1988). 
31. § 201, 88 Stat. at 302. 
32. § 202, 88 Stat. at 304; § 603, 88 Stat. at 324. 
33. See PENNER & ABRAMSON, supra note 21, at 19, 45; James Thurber, The Consequences 
of Budget Refonn for Congressional-Presidential Relations, 499 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
Soc. SCI. 104 (September 1988). 
34. §§101-102, 88 Stat. at 299-300. 
35. In a related action, the Act also delayed the beginning of the fiscal year from June until 
October in order to give Congress time to use the additional budgeting procedures it had estab-
lished. § 501, 88 Stat. at 321. 
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priated before the first budget resolution or after the second one. 36 Any 
spending that exceeded the budget resolutions was addressed in the reconcilia-
tion process which forced appropriations committees to review their alloca-
tions and make the necessary cuts to comport with the budget resolution. 37 
The Act also established time deadlines for each stage of the budgeting proc-
ess. 38 Presumably, the new process would add to congressional credibility as a 
responsible budgeter and would allow Congress to formulate its own spending 
priorities apart from the executive budget.39 
Most importantly, the CBICA created new guidelines for executive use of 
impoundments. Under the Act, impoundments were divided into two catego-
ries: rescissions and deferrals.40 Deferrals entail the delay of spending of funds 
for appropriated purposes. A President requesting a deferral acknowledges 
that the funds will eventually be spent, but not immediately. Congressional 
approval is not necessary for a deferral to be effective. However, if both 
houses vote to disapprove the deferral,41 the President must immediately re-
lease the funds for expenditure. 42 Rescissions resemble Nixon's use of im-
poundments as domestic policy tools.43 In such cases, the President asks the 
Congress to rescind some or all of its appropriation decision.44 A rescission 
must be approved by both houses of Congress within forty-five days to become 
permanent.45 The Act also included a notification procedure which called for 
full disclosure of all presidential impoundments and empowered the Comp-
troller General of the General Accounting Office (GAO) to serve as a watch-
dog for executive efforts to skirt the law.46 
The Nixon impoundments and Congress's response shattered any lingering 
beliefs that consensus existed regarding the role of the federal government in 
36. § 303, 88 Stat. at 309; § 311, 88 Stat. at 316. 
37. § 310, 88 Stat. at 315. 
38. The second resolution and reconciliation requirements were eviscerated when Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings was created. §§ 301-11, 88 Stat. 306-16. 
39. See Louis Fisher, Federal Budget Doldrums: The Vacuum in Presidential Leadership, 
50 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 693, 695 (1990). 
40. Thurber, supra note 33, at I 06. 
41. Originally, the 1974 Act called for a one house veto of deferrals, but after the Supreme 
Court ruled that kind of legislative veto out of order in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 
{1983}, the two house system was adopted. For the text of the original statute, see§ 1013{b}, 88 
Stat. at 335. See also Thurber, supra note 33, at 106. 
42. Even if Congress does nothing, the deferred funds are released at the end of the fiscal 
year. § 1013{b}, 88 Stat. at 335. 
43. They were used extensively during the Ford administration in an effort to contravene 
Congressional spending programs. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 200. 
44. § 1011(3}, 88 Stat. 333. 
45. Id. 
46. § I014{b}, 88 Stat. at 335. 
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society. From then on, it was clear that two separate views would exist. The 
Republican view as espoused by Nixon and later President Reagan called for 
decreased social spending and less intervention by the federal government.47 
The Democratic view demanded sustained government spending and interven-
tion with the goal of achieving social equality.48 The provisions in the CBICA 
demonstrated the loss of budgetary consensus which had existed in previous 
years. The creation of the CBO and the congressional budget committees ex-
hibited Congress's realization that presidents may not always share Congress' 
values regarding budgeting. A congressional alternative had to exist so that 
alternative spending priorities could be devised. The new impoundment rules 
also indicated that Congress no longer felt comfortable with the amount of 
budgetary discretion which it had granted to the executive during the years of 
consensus. 
President Reagan's first few years in office set the political tone for the rest 
of the 1980s as the battle over the budget, which began with Nixon, resumed. 
The difference between the Reagan budget battles and those which occurred 
under Nixon was that Congress had the institutional resources to circumvent 
the President's budget and formulate its own. Unfortunately, this meant that 
neither side could be held entirely accountable for the budget and its prob-
lems.49 
The change in the economy in the late 1970s left America's politicians 
searching for a new philosophy of spending. The conflict between the Presi-
dent and Congress was an essentially political battle. 5° President Reagan's pri-
orities were reduced taxes and increased defense spending.51 Balancing the 
budget was a distant third and easily sacrificed on behalf of these other two 
goals. Likewise, the Democrats in Congress placed a higher priority on main-
taining the rate of spending on domestic programs than on a balanced budget. 52 
As a result, compromising around deficit reduction plans was easier than 
making the cuts necessary to move toward a balanced budget. 
The CBICA was enacted primarily to reassert congressional influence in 
47. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS, 117-179 
(1995) (reprinting all platforms from presidential elections from 1972-1992). 
48. Id. 
49. In his essay, Louis Fisher argues that the creation of the congressional budget by the 
CBICA has added to the problem by allowing both sides to avoid their responsibilities. See 
Fisher, supra note 39, at 696 ("The confusion of multiple budgets creates substantial costs for 
democratic government. Neither the president nor Congress can be held publicly accountable for 
the national budget. Both branches and both parties practice the 'politics of blamesmanship' by 
attacking each other's fiscal record. Witnessing this crossfire, voters cannot fix responsibility."). 
50. See Richard E. Neustadt, Presidents, Politics and Analysis, The Brewster C. Denny 
Lecture at University of Washington (May 13, 1986) at 22-23. 
51. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 47, at 134-36. 
52. See id. at 138-41. 
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the budget process, rather than to lower the deficit. Indeed, bias toward in-
creased expenditures within the system may have existed. 53 As a result of 
budget control gone out of control, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Acts54 
(GRH) were passed to eliminate the deficit. Described as a "bad idea whose 
time has come," the first Act was passed by Congress in 1985.55 That Act 
eliminated the second budget resolution process established by the CBICA and 
it created a table of deficit reduction numbers to be met by Congress each year 
until the budget was balanced in fiscal year 1991.56 If Congress failed to meet 
the deficit reduction numbers, the Comptroller General was given the power to 
direct the President to sequester appropriated funds in order to meet the pro-
jection. 57 The programs which were subject to sequestering included the de-
fense budget and a variety of smaller social programs, but not larger ones, such 
as social security, AFDC and Medicaid. 58 The percentage of cuts were to be 
divided equally between the defense and social programs in order to ensure 
that neither the Republican President nor the Democratic Congress would have 
an incentive to stall the budget negotiations process in an effort to trigger 
automatic sequestering. 59 
GRH failed to meet its goals. Instead of focusing on deficit reduction, 
Congress and the President merely resorted to creative accounting methods to 
make the budget appear as if it was meeting the Act's requirements. 60 A com-
mentator has suggested that instead of encouraging the President and Congress 
to bargain before the threat of sequestering (due to the drastic nature of the 
cuts that might be made as a result), GRH might actually have encouraged 
brinkmanship on both sides. The President and Congress were inclined to wait 
until they saw where the brunt of the mandatory sequestering was going to fall 
before beginning their negotiations. 61 
Despite its drawbacks, the GRH plan was still in effect in 1990. The dras-
tic reduction in spending which the plan called for prompted President Bush 
53. See AARONWILDAVSKY, THENEWPOLmCS OFTHEBUDGETARYPROCESS 156 (1988). 
54. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 
Stat. I 038 (1987). 
55. See JOSEPH WIDTE & AARON WILDAVSKY, THE DEFICIT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 
THE SEARCH FOR REsPONSffiLE BUDGETING IN THE 1980S 445 (1989). The second GRH was 
passed in 1987. Id. 
56. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 717. 
57. §§ 251-52, 99 Stat at 1063-78. 
58. § 255, 99 Stat. at 1082-86. 
59. See Darrell M. West, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Politics of Deficit Reduction, 
499 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 90 (September 1988); WIDTE & WILDAVSKY, supra 
note 55, at 456. 
60. One such gimmick involved the moving of govenunent paydates from the last day of 
fiscal year. See PENNER & ABRAMSON, supra note 21, at 98. 
61. See WILDAVSKY, supra note 53, at 263. 
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and the Democratic leadership in Congress to meet and design a new budget 
procedure which would have less draconian results. The result of these meet-
ings was the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA).62 The BEA did not in-
corporate a balanced budget, focusing instead on simply reducing expenditures 
by $500 billion over the next five years.63 Spending was only peripherally 
matched with revenues in the sense that President Bush was forced to recant on 
his campaign promise of "no new taxes"64 in order to shrink the gap between 
income and outgo. The cornerstone ofthe BEA was its pay-as-you-go (paygo) 
provision that all new spending or tax cut measures would have to be balanced 
by spending cuts or revenue increases somewhere else in the budget. 65 Budg-
eting was supposed to become a zero-sum game, in which nobody won a 
budget increase without somebody losing. 66 At the end of five years, the BEA 
was supposed to revert back to the GRH deficit target and sequestration proce-
dures.67 
The deficit reduction program was scrapped by President Clinton and the 
Democratic majority in Congress soon after Clinton took office. Problems 
with President Clinton's relationship with the Republican Congress elected in 
1994 culminated in the 1995-1996 budget impasse. How the President and 
Congress can resolve their differences and balance the budget is a problem that 
remains to be solved. Whether the solution is allowed to come to fruition de-
pends on the federal judiciary. Before suggesting the changes in federal budg-
eting that may occur and analyzing their viability, it will be useful to make a 
brief examination of basic separation of powers doctrine. 
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
A full accounting of separation of powers doctrine would require a much 
more lengthy Article than this one. This Article will merely identify some 
62. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat 1388-573 (1991). 
63. See WILDAVSKY, supra note 53 at 513. 
64. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 47, at 162. 
65. § 13204, 104 Stat at 1388-616. 
66. This paygo provision was buttressed by the creation of budgetary spending categories. 
These categories which were separated into defense spending, domestic discretionary spending, 
international, and entitlement spending (Social Security was placed off budget) were protected by 
firewalls. Reductions in spending in one category could not be used to increase spending in an-
other. Thus decreases in defense spending as a result of the peace dividend from the end of the 
Cold War had to go toward deficit reduction and could not be used to fund new social programs. 
See James Thurber & Samantha Durst, The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act: The Decline of Con-
gressional Accountability, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED at 383 (Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Op-
penheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993). In order to keep spending in line within these categories, a cate-
gorical sequestration was allowed which would automatically have cut expenditures for all 
programs within the spending category until the spending ceiling was reached. /d. at 382. 
67. § 13101, 104 Stat. at 1388-575. 
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general ideas and theories underlying separation of powers doctrine and indi-
cate how they may affect the development of the new budget regime and proc-
esses that may accompany it. While the new budget regime will emerge re-
gardless of the Supreme Court's application of the separation of powers, the 
emergence could occur much more swiftly and painlessly if an accommodating 
vision of separation of powers is adopted. 
Separation of powers is not a command that flows from any particular sec-
tion of the Constitution. Rather, it is a doctrine that proceeds from the struc-
ture of the federal government.68 The tripartite structure of the government 
and its delineation of different powers to different branches indicate the intent 
to separate powers.69 Under the Constitution, the Congress exercises legisla-
tive power; 70 the President exercises executive power; 71 and the federal courts 
exercise judicial power.72 However, that the government's powers are nomi-
nally separated does not fully explain the separation of powers. How the ex-
ecutive, legislative and judicial branches may exercise power is a key consid-
eration of separation of powers jurisprudence. 
While the Constitution is sometimes quite explicit as to the allocation of 
specific powers, it is vague as to how to assign powers not explicitly granted to 
a particular branch. On what basis a power is deemed executive, legislative or 
judicial is not clear under the Constitution. That legislative and executive 
power are not explicitly defined by the Constitution is part of the problem.73 
Some powers that are exercised by the federal government, e.g., the power to 
budget, may not be clearly executive or legislative. Although the Constitu-
tion's structure suggests that legislative power differs from executive power, 
depending on how a power is defined, particular powers may entail aspects of 
68. Indeed, any argument based on Framer's intent regarding what the particular contours of 
the separation of powers may be misguided. See Russell K. Osgood, Early Versions and Prac-
tices of Separation of Powers: A Comment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 280 (1989) (arguing that 
the beginning of the post-Constitutional era is a particularly bad time to try to assess the state of 
separation of powers or its overarching effect on government because those who ran the govern-
ment were searching for methods to run the government and may have jettisoned ideals for the 
sake of harmonious government function). 
69. See William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the 
Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 266 (1989) (noting that the Constitution provides a 
structure for separation of powers, but does not define legislative, executive or judicial power); 
Russell Osgood, Governmental Functions and Constitutional Doctrine: The Historical Consti-
tution, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 553, 563 (1987) (suggesting that the separation of powers is not a 
uniform doctrine, but rather a concept that stems from the government's structure). 
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
71. See U.S. CONST. art. ll, § 1. 
72. See U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 1. 
73. Conversely, the judicial power of the government is relatively well defined or well cir-
cumscribed by Article ill and the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. 
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both. 
Legislative power is the power to create laws. Executive power is the 
power to administer laws and to run the government. The power to administer 
laws is arguably derivative of legislative power, and does not exist independ-
ently of the legislative power to create law. The power to run the government 
can be defined as the whole power of the government that is neither legislative 
nor judicial. While this amalgamated definition of executive power is expan-
sive and somewhat all encompassing, it may reflect the Framers' intent. The 
Constitution was a break with a monarchical power structure, in which all gov-
ernment power was vested in the sovereign.74 When government power is di-
vided into executive, legislative and judicial power, the executive power can be 
viewed as the residual power which encompasses all power that the judicial 
and legislative powers do not. Indeed, the duty to run the government entails 
responsibilities that are independent of legislative power and which must be 
executed, even in the absence of congressionallawmaking.75 
These views of executive power are not mutually exclusive. As applied to 
some functions, executive power is residual; as applied to others, it is deriva-
tive. Which vision of executive power is appropriate depends on the particular 
power that is involved. For example, the power to conduct foreign policy 
might be viewed as a part of the residual executive power the President exer-
cises. Conversely, the power to administer Department of Labor regulations 
may be a derivative power that flows from the President's duty to execute the 
laws that Congress passes. How a court views the relationship between presi-
dential authority and congressional power will, drive its determinations re-
garding the implementation of separation of powers doctrine. 
A. Three Visions of Separation of Powers 
A multitude of visions of separation of powers exists?6 Even the Supreme 
Court has appeared to adopt different views of separation of powers at differ-
74. See Gwyn, supra note 69, at 266-67 (suggesting that as executive power used to be the 
whole power of government, executive power as originally understood by English may have been 
whatever remained after legislative and judicial power was removed from the whole power of 
government). 
75. For example, the duty to act as commander-in-chief may be independent from Congress' 
legislative power. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
76. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and 
Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 220 (1989) (suggesting the absence of"a coherent and 
generally shared view of separation of powers" at the 1787 Constitutional Convention) and at 261 
(stating that "no clear doctrine" of separation of powers existed in the formative years just after 
the Constitution was passed); Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 TUL. L. 
REV. 2681, 2684 (1996) (suggesting indeterminacy of separation of powers at the founding of the 
Republic). 
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ent times.77 This Article will very briefly sketch three visions of separation of 
powers doctrine and delineate them as loose, blended, and strict visions. As 
befits their designations, these visions range from the least restrictive to the 
most restrictive view of separation of powers. The loose vision of separation 
of powers is based on the idea that the entire power of the government should 
not rest in the same hands. 78 The blended vision rests on the notion that some 
governmental powers must be exercised by particular branches, but that many 
powers can be shared between branches even without explicit constitutional 
authority for the sharing of power. The strict vision is grounded in the notion 
that every governmental power must be exercised solely by the particular 
branch to which the power is assigned. 
The loose version of separation of powers provides an organizing principle 
that allows and promotes flexibility in government administration. Its central 
concern is that government power be exercised by multiple branches of gov-
ernment.79 Having any separation of power promotes the dispersion and 
nonaggregation of power. 80 The mere existence of three branches of govern-
ment with power allocated to each branch may be sufficient to enforce this ver-
sion of separation of powers. 81 If the existence of three branches and some 
77. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers 
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (stating: 
The Supreme Court has vacillated over the years between using a formalistic approach to 
separation-of-powers issues grounded in the perceived necessity of maintaining three dis-
tinct branches of government (and consequently appearing to draw rather sharp bounda· 
ries), and a functional approach that stresses core function and relationship, and permits a 
good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not threatened.). 
Cf. Casper, supra note 76, at 214 ("As put forward by Montesquieu, separation of powers is a 
functional concept; separation is a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition of liberty. Its absence 
promotes tyranny."). 
78. The Federalist Papers provides a good description of the idea. See THE FEDERALIST No. 
47 (James Madison) (Separation of powers "can amount to no more than this, that where the 
whole power of one department of the government is exercised by the same hands which possess 
the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are sub-
verted."). 
79. The separation must be more than merely physical. One branch cannot exercise control 
over other branches. See Victoria Nourse, Toward a ''Due Foundation" for the Separation of 
Powers: The Federalist Papers As Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 456-96 (1996) 
(suggesting that without separation of powers doctrine problems arose when one branch of gov-
ernment controlled the people of another branch, e.g., English monarchs controlled the House of 
Commons through patronage and state legislatures controlled governors by exercising the ability 
to elect them and the ability to raise or lower theipay). Cf. Casper, supra note 76, at 226 
(suggesting that some initial matters of separation of powers were reactions against the British 
parliamentary system). 
80. While an absence of an aggregation of power is a key factor for this vision of separation 
of powers, it is not exclusive to this version of separation of powers. 
81. Providing checks and balances may give life to a generalized doctrine of separation of 
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allocation of power is enough to end separation of powers concerns, the busi-
ness of government may be executed in many different ways under a wide va-
riety of structures. 82 Flexibility of function promotes creative solutions to real 
problems that government must solve, and arguably is the most efficient way to 
run the government. 83 As changes in the functions that government must exe-
cute occur, flexibility allows the government to meet those changes quickly. 
Of course, flexibility can have negatives, since a loose separation of powers 
doctrine does not offer definitive protection against the aggregation of power. 
Fortunately, the checks and balances in the Constitution guarantee that any 
branch that attempts to become too powerful will be checked by other branches 
as they exercise their constitutional perogatives. 84 In addition, public opinion 
can be a check on the power of a rogue branch of government. 
The judiciary's limited role in enforcing the separation of powers is of par-
ticular interest under a loose version of separated powers. The judiciary's role 
in the loose version is relatively small because the power structure created in 
the Constitution is itself a brake on the aggregation of power.85 Relying on 
nonjudicial methods to control the distribution of power through the govern-
ment may seem odd. However, if one considers that a judiciary that deter-
mines which branch of government has the power to perform what function is 
a judiciary with the power to remake or remold the constitutional order, it is 
very possible that the Framers preferred a relatively wide open system of 
checks and balances to tight control by the judiciary. 
A blended vision of the separation of powers embraces a government of 
core and shared powers. Core powers refer both to specific powers that con-
stitutionally must be exercised by a particular branch and to powers essential to 
the branch's exercise of those powers. For example, while powers essential to 
powers by allowing the branches to assert and reassert themselves, thereby protecting their power 
and avoiding the improper aggregation of power. However, that checks and balanc;es exist does 
not ratify any particular vision of separation of powers jurisprudence. Simply, the Constitution 
may provide checks and balances as an implementation of or a prelude to nearly any vision of 
separation of powers that exists. 
82. The variety of structures may be limitless if separation of powers does not envision a 
strict compartmentalization of powers. Indeed, the Framers may not have envisioned such a re-
gime. See Nourse, supra note 79, at 451-52 (arguing Madison's separation was of political power 
rather than government function). 
83. However, efficiency is not necessarily a value honored in constitutional theory. See INS 
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (suggesting constitutional values are more important 
than efficiency). 
84. See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive 
Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 434-35 (1987) (suggesting that separate 
branches with interrelated checks and balances tends to characterize separation of powers). 
85. Id. at 441-42 (explaining the idea advocated by Jesse Choper that courts should stay out 
of many separation of powers issues because checks and balances exist to correct power imbal-
ances that may occur when one branch overreaches). 
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the exercise of Congress's legislative power would be core powers, powers 
relevant to (congressional) oversight of the bureaucracy would not be. Thus 
core powers are exercised by a particular branch, whereas noncore powers may 
overlap and be shared by multiple branches. 86 
The Constitution envisions some explicit blending of powers, 87 but it is 
unclear whether a shared power regime is generally to be viewed as the rule or 
the exception. If a wide range of core powers must be exercised by specific 
branches, some flexibility in governmental administration is lost, as each 
branch is somewhat more confined in its possible functions. However, if the 
core powers involved must be exercised by a particular branch in order to have 
that power be exercised properly, any loss in flexibility can be viewed as a sac-
rifice to the greater good. Where the Constitution grants a core power to a 
particular branch, that power arguably may not be exercised by another branch 
because such a shift in power might upset the balance created under the Con-
stitution. Under a blended vision, non-aggregation concerns are managed 
structurally by the Constitution's grant of core powers to particular branches. 88 
As long as core powers are exercised by the proper branch, how the branches 
exercise shared powers is of little concern. 
Under a blended vision, the judiciary's role is a bit broader than under the 
loose vision. At a minimum, the judiciary must distinguish core powers from 
shared powers. Given this responsibility, the judiciary is bound to intrude to a 
greater degree in determining the allowable government power re-structuring 
under the blended version than under the loose vision. The judiciary, while 
more active in a blended separation of powers scheme, could view the range of 
core powers relatively narrowly or broadly, thus permitting a large or small 
measure of power sharing between and among the branches. 
A strict vision of separation of powers would entail completely separate 
branches of government with separate duties and power shared only where 
such an arrangement was constitutionally mandated. A strict vision would re-
quire that every government power or function not explicitly mentioned in the 
86. See Lloyd N. Cutler, Now is the Time For All Good Men . .. , 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
387, 387 (1989) (arguing that the U. S. Constitution "is a system based on the principle of sepa-
rate branches exercising shared powers."). 
87. For example, while Congress maintains the legislative power, the President has a pri-
mary right to affect that power with his veto. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Similarly, the President 
has the right to appoint government officials, but only with the advice and consent of the Senate 
(or Congress). See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
88. A non-aggregation doctrine is a r~on to have separation of powers, but does not com-
ment on the allocation of specific powers. Of course, this is the context of most, if not all, sepa-
ration of powers jurisprudence. Non-aggregation indicates that once the parameters of a separa-
tion of powers doctrine are set, no branch should exercise functions inconsistent with those 
parameters. 
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Constitution be designated an exercise of executive, legislative, or judicial 
power and that that power or function be exercised only by whatever branch 
the Constitution authorizes to exercise that type of power. This is a somewhat 
simple and simplistic vision of separation of powers. 89 While it is defensible 
under the plain language of the Constitution, it would render government un-
workable and unduly restrained by eliminating a great deal of flexibility in 
government administration.90 These effects are at odds with a conception of 
separation of powers as a doctrine that promotes the effective use of govern-
ment power. 
This strict vision also gives the judiciary the most power to structure and 
restrict governmental power and functions. The central issue under this view 
of separation of powers would be how to define particular governmental pow-
ers. Once the power was defined, how the power could be exercised and who 
could exercise it would be strictly circumscribed. Consequently, the branches 
would have little if any room to maneuver regarding power sharing and power 
structuring. 
The vision of separation of powers the Court chooses to apply may depend 
heavily on what that court believes to be the general purpose of separation of 
powers. If the ultimate goal of separation of powers as reflected by the Con-
stitutional structure is to allow the government to run smoothly, the Court may 
be willing to embrace a vision that allows for maximum flexibility. Con-
versely, if the ultimate goal is deemed to be the cementing of power relations 
between the branches of government to avoid the improper aggregation and 
exercise of power, the Court may embrace a restrictive view of separation of 
powers that vindicates that goal. Regardless of the vision that the Court 
chooses, each has some support in the Constitution, and none is completely 
foreclosed by the language of the Constitution. The next section will briefly 
examine how the Supreme Court has applied the separation of powers in vari-
ous contexts. 
B. Supreme Court Applications ofSeparation of Powers 
While the Supreme Court's general vision of the separation of powers may 
guide its decisions, of greater interest is how the Court has decided particular 
cases involving power-sharing and the creation of mechanisms and processes 
meant to aid in governmental administration, but which were foreign to the 
Constitution. Bowsher v. Synal1 is the most relevant decision regarding 
89. It is also problematic. See Strauss, supra note 77, at 493 (suggesting that theory of sepa-
ration of powers that refuses to allow some combining of functions is unworkable). 
90. Indeed, commentators have argued that a particularly strict view of the separation of 
powers might render the government ungovernable. See generally Cutler, supra note 86. 
91. 478 u.s. 714 (1986). 
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budgetary restructuring. Bowsher concerned an allocation of budgetary power 
between Congress and the President under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act 
of 1985 (GRH or the "Act").92 The Act was passed in order to provide a bal-
anced federal budget by 1991.93 The GRH plan required that budget deficits 
be cut to a certain level every year until balance was reached.94 Under GRH, 
once it was apparent from budget estimates that the deficit would exceed the 
target, the CBO and OMB provided lists of projected budget cuts.95 The 
Comptroller General was given the power to reconcile the budget cuts neces-
sary to meet the deficit target. GRH then forced the President to execute those 
budget cuts without changes.96 The Supreme Court overturned this allocation 
of power. 
After finding that the duties given to the Comptroller General were part of 
the executive power, the Court determined that Congress's power to remove 
the Comptroller General made him a legislative branch officer whose exercise 
of executive power was incompatible with separation of powers doctrine.97 
The Court ruled: 
[W]e conclude that Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of 
an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. To 
permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to 
Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the exe-
cution of the laws .... To permit an officer controlled by Conress to execute 
the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. 9 
That the Supreme Court deemed the power to cut the budget to be an ex-
ecutive function that could not be exercised by the legislative branch is inter-
92. The Act was fonnally named the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
of1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,99 Stat 1038 (1987). 
93. See Bowsher, 418 U.S. at 717. 
94. § 25l(a)(l), 99 Stat. at 1038 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 622(7) (Supp. m 1985). 
95. § 251, 99 Stat. at 1063. 
96. Bowsher, 418 U.S. at 718 (indicating that once the Comptroller General determined 
what cuts were to be made, the President had to issue a sequestration order for the cuts without 
change). 
97. Some commentators have suggested that Congress' ability to remove the Comptroller 
General is only the beginning of the analysis regarding whether he is a legislative branch officer. 
See L. Harold Levinson, Balancing Acts: Bowsher v. Synar, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and Be-
yond, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 527, 536 (1987) (arguing that issue should not have been Comptroller 
General's removability, but whether he would be influenced by removability when drafting report 
required under GRH); Nourse, supra note 79, at 519-21 (suggesting that the question of removal 
power matters for autonomy and independence reasons, but that the main consideration should be 
whether the ability to remove has the effect of giving the legislature power over the executive 
branch). 
98. Bowsher, 418 U.S. at 726. 
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esting.99 The line between legislative and executive power regarding the 
budget and fiscal control is unclear. Congress retains the power of the 
purse.10° Congress appropriates funds, develops the budget, and sets deficit 
targets that must be respected. Yet, Congress, through a legislative branch of-
ficer, cannot make budget cuts to reach the deficit target because that function 
is an executive function.101 This distinction is worrisome and problematic.102 
The power to make budget cuts is the power to determine priorities regarding 
how to spend a limited amount of money. Similarly, the power to spend a lim-
ited amount of money is the power to budget. Therefore, Congress can deter-
mine priorities in creating a budget and can constrain the amount of money that 
can be spent through a binding budget deficit target, but cannot enforce that 
budget deficit target through its own mechanisms once it is clear the target will 
be exceeded. 
Bowsher reflects a formalist103 and proceduralist view of separation of 
powers. Under Bowsher, Congress can maintain minute control over fiscal 
matters, but only by exercising the specific legislative powers given to it under 
the Constitution. Unfortunately, the substance of the power exercised by a 
particular branch appears less important than how the power is exercised. Pre-
99. Some commentators have suggested that the Comptroller General's power under GRH 
was not exercise of executive power. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 97, at 533-34. 
100. See Arnold, supra note 4, at 20 ("[T]he major source of power that Congress has under 
our system is the power to appropriate money, or to refuse to appropriate money, or to appropri-
ate money only under certain conditions."); see generally Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the 
Purse, 97 YALE L. J. 1343 (1988). 
101. One issue that the Court did not explore is why the President cannot delegate or at least 
acquiesce in the delegation of his power to another branch of government. As we have seen since 
the New Deal, Congress can delegate significant portions of its power. See Abner S. Greene, 
Checks and Balanced in An Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 123, 126 (1994) 
("Congress may give away legislative power and insulate such delegated power from total presi-
dential control[.]"); Sargentich, supra note 84, at 437-38 (suggesting that rulemaking is so akin to 
legislating that allowing rulemaking outside of legislative branch arguably diminishes require-
ment of separation of powers). Although there may be presidential delegations that directly run 
afoul of specific Constitutional provisions, e.g. the duty to give periodic updates on the state of 
the Union, if the President is not constitutionally compelled to perform a particular function, why 
the President cannot delegate it is unclear. 
102. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733. (The Bowsher Court explained what constitutes execu-
tive power as such: 
Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very 
essence of'execution' of the law. Under Section 251, the Comptroller General must exer-
cise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act. He must also inter-
pret the provisions of the Act to determine precisely what budgetary calculations are re-
quired. Decisions of that kind are typically made by officers charged with executing a 
statute.) 
103. See Suzanna Sherry, Separation of Powers: Asking a Different Question, 30 WM. & 
MARYL. REV. 287,292-93 (1989) (criticizing Bowsher Court's formalism). 
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sumably, Congress can exercise its general power to appropriate by providing 
a limited amount of money through piecemeal appropriations designed to keep 
the government funded only in the short term. If Congress had the sustained 
will, it could provide such piecemeal appropriations in order to maintain very 
strict control over its deficit targets. However, once Congress provides appro-
priations for a full year, it loses the ability to revisit its appropriations even 
when its deficit target will be surpassed, because the president retains the spe-
cific power to control the appropriations mix once Congress appropriates 
funds.104 
The Court seemed to ignore the fact that using the Comptroller General to 
determine the necessary budget cuts was an agreed upon way to ensure that 
Congress's legitimate budget deficit projection was properly met without undue 
political wrangling.105 Using the Comptroller General's projections was the 
political solution chosen, given that some entity's projections had to be used. 
This was particularly so, given that the ultimate budget cuts were largely for-
mulaic.106 More importantly, the solution was ratified by President Reagan 
when he signed GRH. 
A general bar to congressional usurpation of purely executive power is 
clearly reasonable. However, the idea that Congress, even with the consent of 
the President, cannot exercise a power that arguably is both executive and/or 
legislative is troublesome. Such a restriction hamstrings the type of responsive 
and responsible government the public deserves. If the Court retains a narrow 
view of Congress's power over budget cuts, other creative compromises in 
budget matters could be invalidated. The remaining issue would be where 
Congress's legislative power ends and where the President's executive power 
begins in the budget process. If the area in which the legislative and executive 
branches can share power is too small to allow the branches to compromise 
I04. Executive power may be viewed temporally. Executive power may be that power that is 
exercised once Congress has legislated. Viewed in that manner, Congress is disallowed from re-
visiting appropriations mix once budget legislation passes. See Sargentich, supra note 84, at 481-
82 (suggesting that Bowsher majority distinguishes legislative and executive functions sequen-
tially-Congress passes law, once it is gone, actions that interpret and implement the law are ex-
ecutive in nature); see also, Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733 ("[A]s Chadha makes clear, once Con-
gress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends."). 
I 05. While the ability of GRH to actually fulfill its promise is debatable, the Supreme Court's 
dismissal of a mutually agreed upon means of moving toward a balanced budget is troubling. 
I06. Given the nature of the budget cuts, the determination to cut was largely formulaic. 
Oddly enough, that the budget cuts were not the product of Congressional deliberation may have 
been the problem with the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings procedures. See Paul Gewirtz, Realism in 
Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 343, 349 (1989) (arguing that the real 
problem in Bowsher was that the Congress completely abdicated its duty to legislate deliberately 
on the issue of budget cuts); see also Stith, supra note I 00, at I394-95 (arguing that Congress 
has both power to authorize appropriations and duty to monitor and restrict appropriations). 
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meaningfully, the new budget regime may have little or no chance of being 
implemented in a creative and efficient way. 
Unfortunately, in deciding other separation of powers cases, the Supreme 
Court has indicated a willingness to rely on formalism. In INS v. Chadha, 107 
the Court invalidated the legislative veto, ruling that bicameral passage and 
presentment is the proper way for Congress to exert its legislative will. Under 
the legislative scheme in Chadha, Congress assigned the Attorney General the 
duty to determine whether a deportable alien could remain in the U.S.108 That 
determination was subject to a legislative veto that allowed either house of 
Congress to reverse the Attorney General's decision by a simple majority 
vote.109 The Court ruled that once the initial power to decide the alien's fate 
was given to the Attorney General, the exercise of that power was an exercise 
of executive power alterable only through bicameral passage and presentment 
of a bill requiring the alien's deportation.110 
Chadha proceeds from a formalist vision. The Chadha Court required bi-
cameral passage and presentment without regard for the substance of the leg-
islative power involved or the functional similarity between the subject rule 
and bicameral passage and presentment. In the absence of the statute at issue in 
Chadha, Congress could have exercised the power to determine whether a 
particular deportable alien could remain in the United States. Before the sub-
ject statute was passed, a deportable alien had to present a private bill to Con-
gress requesting to remain in the United States.m Both houses of Congress 
had to approve the bill, and the President had to sign the bill. The private bill 
was treated like any other bill. If the deportable alien could convince both 
houses of Congress and the executive branch that she should be allowed to re-
main in the U.S., she could remain.112 The legislative veto in Chadha required 
the same consent, but with a twist. The legislative veto reversed the order of 
consent and allowed Congress's silence on an alien's request to stay in the U.S. 
to be deemed consent. 
The legislative veto scheme in Chadha retained the requirement that both 
houses of Congress and the executive branch be convinced that the alien be 
allowed to stay. However, it made the process simpler by declining to involve 
Congress unless one house of Congress was sufficiently interested in a par-
ticular case that that house voted by majority to block the Attorney General's 
107. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
108. /d. at 924-25. 
109. /d. at 925. 
110. /d. at 954-55. 
111. !d. at 932-33. 
112. See Sheny, supra note 103, at 291-92 (criticizing the Chadha Court's fonnalism and 
suggesting that the legislative veto is the functional equivalent of bicameral passage and present-
ment). 
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decision. Functionally, no separation of powers problem exists, as Congress 
merely exercised its legitimate legislative power, albeit at a different time in 
the legislative process than usual. Apparently, the Court either believed that 
the legislative veto scheme was not the equivalent of bicameral passage and 
presentment or that this fact did not matter.113 Based on its reasons, the 
Chadha Court refused to allow legislative flexibility on an issue that arguably 
does not impact the basic structure of the Constitution. This suggests a rela-
tively strict and formal interpretation of separation of powers. 114 
Although Chadha and Bowsher suggest that the formalism may defeat at-
tempts at creative government, they can be read more narrowly. The two most 
important principles that flow from these cases is that one branch cannot exer-
cise power not granted to it and that one branch may not unduly burden the le-
gitimate exercise of another branch's power.115 These principles have been ap-
plied in different cases with differing results for creative government. In 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of 
Aircraft Noise, 116 the creative government solution was overturned. In Morri-
son v. Olson, 117 the solution was approved. 
At issue in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority was Congress's 
power to create a Review Board that could exercise veto power over decisions 
made by a regional airport authority that was to run two airports formerly 
owned by the federal government. Congress created the Review Board, con-
sisting of nine members of Congress acting in their personal capacities, when it 
ceded government control over National Airport and Dulles Airport to the 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority.118 Citizens for the Abatement of 
Aircraft Noise, a citizen group, complained that the Board unconstitutionally 
exercised power in violation of separation of powers.119 The Court agreed, 
ruling the scheme unconstitutiona1.120 More importantly, the Court provided 
some of the most formalistic language ever written. Without deciding the na-
113. A legislative veto scheme arguably is not the equivalent of bicameral passage and pre-
sentment in that a legislative veto appears to frustrate legitimate executive authority. See Sargen-
tich, supra note 84, at 469 (concern with legislative veto often is that executive authority be-
comes contingent on congressional will, with the result being that the President is not really 
hegemonic is his legitimate domain). Cf. Greene, supra note 101, at 151 (suggesting that Feder-
alist Papers proposed a strong executive acting within narrow confines). 
114. But see Sherry, supra note 103, at 295-99 (suggesting that Morrison v. Olson was much 
less formalistic opinion and may signal an end to formalism in separation of powers analysis). 
115. See Greene, supra note 101, at 126 ("Congress may neither draw executive power to 
itself nor seek to legislate outside the Article I, Section 7 framework."). 
116. 501 u.s. 252 (1991). 
117. 487 u.s. 654 (1988). 
118. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 255. 
119. Id. at 261-67. 
120. Id. at 276. 
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ture of the power the Review Board exercised, the court ruled: "If the [Board's] 
power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to 
exercise it. If the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity 
with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, Sec. 7. "121 
Such language represents a stark view of the separation of powers. Ar-
guably, such language suggests a single, inflexible way to run the government. 
Fortunately, the language may not be as strict as it appears on first reading. 
The opinion can be read to comment only on how power must ultimately be 
exercised. The language may mean only that the ultimate exercise of legisla-
tive power must come from Congress. Simply, whenever a rule is to have pro-
spective, general application, or power is exercised in a way that it will have 
the force of law, Congress must legislate through bicameral passage and pre-
sentment procedures.122 Such a ruling would not render creative solutions to 
government problems impossible, it would only restrict how ultimate power 
could be exercised. 
Some of the parameters for the creative use of power were sketched in 
Morrison v. Olson. Morrison involved a challenge to the independent counsel 
provisions to the Ethics in Government Act.123 Those provisions allowed the 
appointment of an independent prosecutor when charges against members in 
the executive branch were deemed to require a counsel somewhat independent 
of the Department of Justice.124 In Morrison, the appointment of the inde-
pendent counsel was challenged, in part, on the grounds that the Attorney 
General's ability to remove counsel only for good cause unduly impacted the 
executive branch's ability to exercise inherently executive prosecutorial pow-
ers. The Court ruled the independent counsel procedure constitutional, noting 
that the Attorney General retained the discretion to request that an independent 
counsel be appointed, that the Attorney General retained some power to re-
move the independent counsel, and that all power to supervise the independent 
counsel rested with the executive branch.125 
Morrison and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority suggest that the 
application of principles under separation of powers is fact-specific. If uncon-
ventional government structures are not dismissed out of hand as unconstitu-
tional it may allow for the sanctioning of flexible governmental solutions to 
serious governmental problems. If the solutions are well-structured and con-
tain powers that are carefully delineated, such solutions may yet be acceptable 
121. !d. 
122. Such statements seem to run counter to the modem understanding of the administrative 
state in which rulemaking is present and allowed. See supra note 101 (suggesting that rulemaking 
is legitimate exercise oflegislative power). 
123. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 654. 
124. For summary of relevant independent counsel provisions, see id. at 660-65. 
125. !d. at 693-96. 
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to a formalist court. Whether such a solution can be crafted for our nation's 
budget process is unclear. 
V. THE BUDGET PROCESS 
Prior to the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Congress gen-
erally reacted to the sitting President's proposed budget, rather than question-
ing his policy objectives. In the aftermath of the Nixon impoundments and the 
CBICA, Congress assumed a much stronger role vis-a-vis the president in cre-
ating the federal budget. Currently, the President submits a detailed budget 
proposal which provides general initiatives and areas of emphasis. At times, 
the President's budget becomes the working paper for the budget process. On 
other occasions, it is deemed so out of tune with congressional budgetary ideas 
that it is scrapped. Once Congress sees the President's proposal, Congress cre-
ates a budget consonant with its desires. After some period of discussions and 
meetings, Congress passes a non-binding budget resolution presenting its gen-
eral ideas for the budget.126 Congress then passes multiple appropriations bills 
that comprise the budget.127 These appropriations provide the funds necessary 
for government agencies and entities to perform their statutory mandates. 
During the process, Congress and the President discuss and negotiate vari-
ous budget proposals. That the President retains the power to veto spending 
bills provides the impetus for compromise. The historical give and take be-
tween the President and Congress has led to many diverse procedural arrange-
ments designed to preserve the power relationship between the President and 
Congress, skirt the issue of partisan divisiveness, control the size of the deficit, 
and preserve economic prosperity. 
A. Shared Executive and Legislative Power Over Budgeting 
As with many government processes, the power to budget is functionally 
shared by the executive and legislative branch. Each has the power to stop the 
budget process. As importantly, each branch must consider the goals and de-
sires of the other branch before acting. Some measure of cooperation must 
exist between the branches because each is a repeat player in the budget proc-
ess. The knowledge that both parties will have to agree on appropriations 
every year suggests that some measure of coordination must occur to avoid an-
nual impasses.128 
126. For general explanation of the budget process, see Tiefer, supra note 3, at 427. 
127. The Constitution requires that Congress appropriate money for particular purposes be-
fore it can be drawn from the Treasucy. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. ("No Money shall be drawn 
from the Treasucy, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."). 
128. See Tiefer, supra note 3, at 439 (mentioning that Congress and the President's ability to 
close government combined with the annual nature of appropriations suggests that Congress and 
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Congress's effective power over budgeting rests with the fact that Congress 
retains control over the timing of the process and the procedures related to the 
budget.129 Depending on how Congress structures the appropriations process, 
it can retain significant control over the budgeting process. By passing appro-
priations bills in any way it wishes, Congress can retain functional control over 
the policy initiatives in the budget process in the same way it controls policy 
initiatives in all laws. By providing appropriations in many bills or a few bills, 
Congress can package the budget in whatever way makes sense to advance the 
congressional leadership's agenda. 
However, the President also has power. The President retains the same 
veto power over appropriations bills that he has over any other law Congress 
passes. Consequently, he can advance his budget initiatives by threatening to 
veto appropriations bills. While this power is effective, it is quite a bit more 
blunt than Congress's power. A presidential veto stops the show. However, 
the President's power is not absolute, as his veto can be overridden with a two-
thirds vote of both houses of Congress. 130 
In addition to his constitutionally mandated veto power, the President has 
recently been given a statutory line item veto for budget issues.131 Though 
considered a possible solution to the deficit problem, the line item veto may be 
ineffective in augmenting the President's effective power over budgeting. The 
line item veto allows the President to cut appropriations, but does not grant 
him wholesale power to reshape the budget. The line item veto does not affect 
the President's ability to get his initiatives funded, since the veto does not give 
the President the power to augment appropriations. Additionally, many budget 
items are not subject to the presidential veto.132 Consequently, the amount of 
federal expenditures actually subject to the veto is arguably too small to have 
any real effect on the budget.133 Indeed, the line item veto may provide the 
President little power to effect change. Aside from functional weaknesses in 
the President will bargain to conclusion). 
129. See Anthony R. Petrilla, Note, The Role of the Line-Item Veto in the Federal Balance of 
Power, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 479 (1994) (suggesting that Congress has lion's share of 
power in budget debates). 
130. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
131. See 2 U.S.C.A § 1021 (West 1997). Of course, the line item veto may ultimately be 
ruled unconstitutional, as the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia did in Byrd v. 
Raines, 65 U.S.L.W. 2660 (April 10, 1997), before that decision was vacated by the Supreme 
Court on the basis of a lack of standing. Raines v. Byrd, No. 96-1671, 1997 WL 348141, (June 
26, 1997). 
132. But see Tiefer, supra note 3, at 442-43 (suggesting that future expansion of line item 
veto power may augment it). 
133. See Petrilla, supra note 129, at 471-72 (noting that when the article was published, 60% 
of the federal budget was non-discretionary and that that would lead to problems with what 
budget cuts could be made). 
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the line item veto's ability to help end budget deficits, any attempt by the Presi-
dent to use the line item veto can be circumvented by an organized Congress. 
Even if a President planned to trim expenditures, Congress could control 
the order in which appropriations bills are presented to the President. Con-
gress may pass a few or many hundred appropriations bills in whatever order it 
likes. If Congress knows particular budget areas where its priorities do not 
match the President's, Congress may withhold appropriations until an agree-
ment is reached on those areas. Once Congress's desires are met, a President 
could be left with only the opportunity to veto appropriations for programs that 
are important to him. One result of passing bills in strategic order could be to 
force the President to choose between vetoing bills providing appropriations to 
his pet projects or unbalancing the budget.134 Frustrating the President's con-
trol over the budget can hardly be viewed as problematic, as allowing the 
President any significant control over budgeting initiatives might be unconsti-
tutional under a particularly strict view of separation of powers.135 
Under different circumstances, a line item veto could provide a president 
with significant power over the appropriations process.136 The line item veto 
can check a spendthrift Congress and can be used to reshape budget initiatives 
when the object of budgetary policy is smaller government. Although current 
conditions suggest that the line item veto would not be missed, it would be a 
mistake to reject it outright on separation of powers grounds.137 Such a deci-
sion would negate the idea that both the executive and legislative branches can 
defend their institution from abuse by the other. Simply, if Congress and the 
President can agree to some method that allows both branches to maintain the 
power over the budget that each wants to maintain, and that agreement does 
not violate an explicit provision of the Constitution, a beneficial doctrine like 
134. Cf Arnold, supra note 4, at 28 (noting different ways in which the line item veto can be 
used by Congress in the budgeting process). Of course, maneuvering around a line item veto is 
only necessary if Congress cannot repeal or restrict the statutory line-item veto in times of budg-
etary discord. See J. Gregory S_idak, The Line-Item Veto Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1498, 
1500 (1995) ("The 104th Congress simply cannot credibly commit future Congresses to forbear 
from exercising their discretion to repeal, suspend, or otherwise circumscribe line-item veto 
authority conferred to the President by statute."). 
135. See Sidak, supra note 134, at 1501 ("Ironically, a line-item veto purportedly conferred 
by statute is likely to survive attack on Presentment Clause grounds only if it creates no legal 
authority that the President does not already possess under the Constitution.") (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
136. A change in Congressional attitude could make more items of spending subject to budg-
eting in general or the line item veto in particular. See, e.g., Tiefer, supra note 3, passim 
(suggesting that health care entitlements will soon become budget items subject to cuts). 
137. Others have suggested that such a rejection would not be problematic. See Sidak, supra 
note 134, at 1502 (arguing that executive and legislative branch "agree[ment] to exchange or 
commingle ... duties and prerogatives" violates separation of powers doctrine). 
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separation of powers should not invalidate the agreement. 
79 
Congress and the President can press their budget policy initiatives by al-
together stopping the budget process. The line item veto is a mechanism that 
recognizes the legitimacy of competing presidential and congressional budg-
eting desires and seeks to avoid a destructive clash by ceding the absolute 
power to reshape the budget over some limited range of appropriations. De-
veloping a mechanism to avoid budget impasse is the essence of good govern-
ment, not the beginning of an inter-branch power struggle. Indeed, no real in-
terbranch struggle can occur since Congress has the unilateral ability to 
maneuver around the President's line item veto power whenever necessary. 
B. The Balanced Budget Imperative 
The changed economic outlook of the political elites and the political 
mood of the electorate are the primary factors at work in the move toward a 
balanced budget philosophy of spending. The first condition has developed 
from a growing realization that the federal government no longer possesses the 
capability of using Keynesian fiscal policy to stimulate and control the econ-
omy.138 Recognition of the electorate's historic predilection for balanced fed-
eral budgets139 is also occurring. During the 1980s and into the 1990s, the 
general·public did not seem to act on its preference for balanced budgets. This 
failure to act may be related to the President and Congress's ability to hide be-
hind the facade of the budget control philosophy and the bifurcated philosophy 
of responsibility so as to avoid being held accountable for the deficits. This 
disjunction between the public's general beliefs and their willingness to act on 
them arguably ended with the 1992 presidential candidacy of Ross Perot. 
Although the suggestion that a regime change is imminent implies that the 
current state of the economy and/or budget are in or near a crisis state, objec-
tive indicators suggest that no such crisis exists. Unemployment and inflation 
are both fairly low, the stock market is very strong, and the economy has been 
growing slowly, but surely, for the past five years. Even the latest deficit fig-
ures show that it has decreased each of the last few years and has decreased 
around $100 billion.140 However, the impending bankruptcy of the largest en-
138. The large amount of uncontrollable spending within the budget coupled with the size of 
the economy means that the amount of extra deficit spending needed to maintain social spending 
and promote economic growth during recessionary periods may be enormous. As Herbert Stein 
states, the old Keynesian nostrum that "in the long run we are all dead" has been abandoned after 
twenty years of holding sway. We are instead living in the long run. HERBERT STEIN, PRESI-
DENTIAL ECONOMICS 375-76 (1994). This change in focus from maintaining short-run prosperity 
to building security for the long run will most certainly be reflected in the emergent philosophy of 
spending. 
139. See JAMES D. SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGETS AND AMERICAN POLmCS 1 (1988). 
140. For a listing ofbudget figures, see OMB Historical Tables, supra note I6,passim. 
Q 
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titlement programs has forced many politicians to consider the present time pe-
riod to be critical. According to a recent report by the Bi-partisan Committee 
on Entitlements, the hospital insurance segment of the Medicare system will be 
insolvent in 2002 and social security will be bankrupt within forty years unless 
changes are made in the entitlement system.141 The press for a balanced 
budget has emerged from such concerns and will remain for the foreseeable 
future.t42 
In 1995 and 1996, the federal government was closed twice due to the 
President's and Congress's failure to agree on a budget compromise.143 In try-
ing to fulfill their Contract with America, the Republican majority in the 
House pushed for large tax cuts for the middle class, huge savings in Medicare 
and Medicaid expenditures, and block grants to states for many social serv-
ices.144 The Republicans claimed that they could balance the budget by 2002, 
and, after a great deal of negotiation, President Clinton agreed.145 A balanced 
budget will arrive soon, the only question is whose policy preferences will 
drive it. 
Under the new balanced budget regime, many policy differences that were 
driven to the background in prior budget control years will come to the fore-
front. In the era of huge deficits, almost all policy initiatives could be funded. 
When the budget must balance, the policy choices become stark and painful. 
Once the budget battle hinges solely on conflicting policy initiatives, whether 
the President or Congress controls the implementation of those initiatives is 
particularly important. Congress controls legislative policy preferences; the 
President controls executive policy preferences. At issue is how to distinguish 
legislative policy preferences from executive policy preferences and how 
power can be allocated between the executive and legislative branches. What-
ever solution is chosen must comport with separation of powers principles and 
be ratified by the judiciary in order to be effective.146 Under the new regime, a 
philosophy of responsibility must prevail which can hold both branches re-
sponsible rather than one that will allow both branches to avoid responsibility. 
141. James Popkin et al., The Medicare Fight and The Budget War, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD 
REPORTS, May 15, 1995, at 45. 
142. If nothing else, the press for a balanced budget amendment will keep the debate in the 
forefront of public policy. 
143. John F. Harris & Eric Pianin, President Praises Passage of Budget, WASH. POST, April 
26, 1996, at Al, All. 
144. David Cloud & Jackie Koszczuk, GOP's All or Nothing Approach Hangs on a Bal-
anced Budget, CONGRESSIONALQUARTERLYWEEKLYREVIEW, Dec. 9,1995, at3709, 3713. 
145. Harris & Pianin, supra note 143. 
146. A balanced budget amendment might cause greater judicial involvement in the budget 
process. See Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become Account-
ants? A Look at State Experiences, 12 J. L. & POL. 153, 191 (1996). 
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C. New Methods of Balanced Budget and Deficit Control 
The country should expect unconventional solutions to the budget prob-
lem. 147 If Congress and the President can agree on a balanced budget deal, it 
will rest on predictions regarding the economy. When the economy inevitably 
under performs, the parties will need a mechanism to bring the budget back 
into balance.148 When that occurs, some of the same policy disagreements that 
led to the 1995-1996 impasse will arise. A possible solution would be the es-
tablishment of a Deficit Control Commission whose function would be to 
monitor the federal budget and propose cuts to the budget to achieve balance. 
Preliminary suggestions for the Commission's structure would involve the 
sharing of power to help avoid the use of each branch's constitutional powers 
to stop the budget process. The members of the Commission would be chosen 
by or drawn from both the executive and legislative branches. The members 
could be removable only by agreement of both the executive and legislative 
branches. 149 
The Deficit Control Commission would only function when the deficit tar-
get or balanced budget appeared unlikely to be met. At such a point, the 
Commission would issue a report on the deficit and propose budget cuts to 
meet the expressed budget target. Congress would vote on whether to accept 
the commission's recommendations without amendment, and then make the 
budget cuts. The President could sign or veto the resulting legislation. If the 
Commission's recommendations were rejected by either side, the commission 
could either revisit the issues or both sides could acknowledge the failure to 
meet the goal and move through the regular budget process, deficit and a11.150 
This commission is not an ultimate solution, but a way to make budget cuts 
as bipartisan and nondisruptive as possible. The plan offers three advantages 
over the current system. First, it allows for the normal budgeting process to 
occur every year. Since the Commission would only become active when the 
budget target is not met, it should not be considered a substitute for the politi-
cal process. The reasons the target might be exceeded may range from faulty 
economic forecasts to partisan intransigence. Based on its assessment of the . 
economy, the Commission could recommend minor or substantial cuts. 
Second, every program, including entitlements, could be subject to the 
147. Expectations that budget problems would lead to structural governmental change is not 
novel. See Levinson, supra note 97, at 552 n.94 (professing concern that massive budget break-
down could lead to pressure for radical change in the government institutions). 
148. This is very similar to the situation faced in Bowsher regarding budget cuts that had to 
be made in order to reach deficit targets. 
149. One can consider how the Bowsher Court would have viewed GRH if the Comptroller 
General had been more easily removable. See Levinson, supra note 97, at 548 (hypothesizing a 
Comptroller General removable both by Congress and the President). 
150. Of course, a balanced budget amendment could make of budget failure less likely. 
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Commission's recommendations. This would allow the Commission to spread 
the cuts across a number of different programs rather than focusing on a few. 
A baseline for sequestering might be established to keep any programs from 
being scrapped entirely. The Commission could also offer political cover for 
those who support cutting entitlements, but fear the political consequences of 
voting in that manner. Assenting to the recommendations of a neutral commis-
sion may appear more forthright than merely standing by one's party. 
The third and most telling advantage is that the Commission would allow 
the public to affix responsibility to one branch or the other if the budget goals 
were not met. Either Congress has failed to act by not passing the cuts, or the 
President has side-tracked the goal by vetoing the cuts. These distinctions 
make for the accountability that has been missing from the current budget re-
gime. While a presidential veto can stop the proposed budget cuts, a veto of 
legislation proposed by a bipartisan commission has different political impli-
cations than a veto oflegislation born of party politics. A veto of the Commis-
sion's work suggests that the President has put his policy initiatives above the 
collective judgment of a body of experts; a veto of possibly partisan budget 
cuts merely suggests disagreement with congressional leadership. 
However, a separation of powers issue remains. If making budget cuts is 
an exercise of executive power, passing legislation regarding budget cuts could 
be deemed as violative of separation of powers principles as granting the 
Comptroller General sequester power under GRH. If the problem with the 
budgetary scheme in Bowsher was that a legislative branch member dictated to 
the President, the Deficit Control Commission does not eliminate this concern. 
Even though the Commission would not have the power to make budget cuts, 
budget cuts would eventually become part of a legislative command to the 
President, particularly if Congress ever overrode a presidential veto in order to 
enforce the Commission's suggestions. In such a situation, the legislative 
branch would be dictating an arguably executive function to the executive 
branch.151 A refusal to allow this power, even in the face of presidential acqui-
escence, demonstrates how a formalist separation of powers doctrine could 
frustrate responsible government. 
Even if making budget cuts is an exercise of executive power, Congress 
151. Co=entators have suggested that Bowsher rests on the fact that Congress was improp-
erly exercising executive power. See Greene, supra note 101, at 166-68 (discussing Bowsher in 
nonaggrandizement terms); Strauss, supra note 77, passim (considering aggrandizement as a key 
to explaining Bowsher). See also, Morrison, 478 U.S. at 734. The problem may be even starker. 
The Bowsher Court determined that Congress had "retain[ed] control over the execution of the 
Act and ... intruded into the executive function." Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734. Arguably, Con-
gress may impermissibly intrude into the executive function whenever it exercises undue influ-
ence over budget cuts. 
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retains the right to influence that exercise of power.152 Congress can reference 
past budget problems in passing future appropriations bills or indicate that fu-
ture appropriations will depend on current budget cuts. Simply, both the leg-
islative and executive branches are constitutionally responsible for budgets and 
politically responsible for deficits. If the branches can reach an agreement on 
sharing budgetary power, the separation of powers doctrine should not stop 
it 153 The separation of powers doctrine exists to ensure the effective use of 
power, and thus, should not impact the political solution that Congress and the 
President reach. 154 
The Constitution does not force the branches to handle the budget in any 
particular way. Arguably, any method that Congress and the President agree to 
use to meet the nation's budget problems should be constitutional.155 The ten-
sion between shared budgetary power and separation of powers doctrine rests 
on the following two questions. First, if the President and Congress install a 
power sharing method that is not expressly or implicitly prohibited by the Con-
stitution, does it stand? Second, if the President and Congress install a mecha-
nism that is not specifically ratified by the Constitution, does it stand? Neither 
of these questions ought to stop good government. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The 1995-1996 budget impasse suggests that the United States is about to 
embark on a new budget regime that entails a balanced budget imperative 
152. See KENNETH DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 2.2 (1994) 
("The departments exercise 'coercive influence' over each other on a routine basis; indeed. the 
Constitution is designed to imbue each department with that coercive influence."). 
153. Of course, a less charitable explanation for budgetary power sharing and compromise 
exists. Congress and the President desire to control the entire budgeting process because each 
believes it has the proper initiatives to solve fiscal problems: If the issue is merely the raw power 
that each branch will exercise, separation of powers doctrine may be relevant to the debate. Con-
versely, any issue regarding raw power may be solved by reference to the constitutional powers 
that each branch can use to protect itself. If one branch feels that its power is being taken, it can 
regain that power by vigorously exercising its constitutional prerogatives. 
154. But see Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and The Idea of Inde-
pendence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 341 (1989) (suggesting that the judiciary should play a 
reserve role in separation of powers jurisprudence to ensure that executive or legislative hegem-
ony does not become an issue). 
155. Other commentators might agree. See, e.g., Sheny, supra note 103, at 289 (suggesting 
that courts' refusal to allow certain power arrangements between political actors which solve 
"real world problems" amounts to formalism that "can be characterized as an abdication of re-
sponsibility by careless deference to a prior determination"). Robert F. Nagel, A Comment on the 
Rule of Law Model of Separation of Powers, 30 WM & MARY L. REV. 355, 358-59 (1989) 
(suggesting that under Chadha, the mere agreement to share power is not sufficient to end sepa-
ration of powers concern, as the President and Congress agreed to the legislative veto that was 
struck). 
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combined with explicit power sharing by Congress and the President. The new 
budget regime may require the installation of mechanisms unfamiliar to the 
Constitution. These mechanisms may push the current limits of the separation 
of powers. Whether such mechanisms are absolutely necessary and whether 
they will work if necessary remains to be seen. Whether such methods should 
be allowed to work is clear. They should. 
